In Pavoni v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 2015 No. 13-55761 (“Pavoni”), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs’ expert declaration in conjunction with circumstantial evidence of the incident were sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact and reverse a summary judgment order for Chrysler Group, LLC (“Chrysler”) in response to allegations that a “false park” defect in decedents’ vehicle caused their deaths.
Plaintiffs were the three surviving children of the elderly deceased couple, Roy Coats (age 83) and Rose Coats (age 75). Decedents were found dead in the garage of their Manifee, California home on February 27, 2011. Mrs. Coats was found pinned between her Chrysler Grand Caravan’s open driver-side door and inside of the garage door frame, where she had ostensibly suffocated to death. Mr. Coats was found on the garage floor with his left ankle under the front driver-side tire. He was allegedly struck by the vehicle and died from a heart attack. There were no witnesses to the accident.
Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against Chrysler for strict products liability, negligent design and failure to warn, negligence and wrongful death. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that a “false park” defect in the automatic transmission allowed Mrs. Coats to place the gear shift in a position between the “park” and the “reverse” gears, leading Mrs. Coats to believe the vehicle was parked. Plaintiffs alleged Mrs. Coats then exited the vehicle, when the vehicle suddenly self-shifted into reverse, and began moving causing her to become trapped.
In its defense, Chrysler moved for summary judgment, contending that plaintiffs presented insufficient admissible evidence of the alleged vehicle defect and of how the incident occurred. Plaintiffs opposed Chrysler’s motion for summary judgment by lodging a declaration from plaintiffs’ design defect expert, who opined that there was a “false park” design defect in the Grand Caravan and that it more likely than not caused the decedents’ deaths. To substantiate his assertion, plaintiffs’ expert explained the history of the alleged “false park” defect in Chrysler vehicles, the engineering mechanics of the alleged “false park” defect, and how the alleged “false park” defect could be avoided. The expert also tested the Coats’ Grand Caravan and found that the “false park” defect existed on the vehicle. Further, plaintiffs’ expert provided evidence from a 1990-91 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigation of several hundred prior “false park” reports against defendant relating to the Grand Caravan, and earlier automobile models. Notably, the investigation cited by plaintiffs’ expert revealed that the “false park” was characteristic of all vehicles tested.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted Chrysler’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the facts presented by plaintiffs and their expert were “insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection between Defendant’s actions and Decedents’ deaths.” Plaintiffs appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s summary judgment order and remanded the case to the District Court. The Ninth Circuit determined that plaintiffs’ expert declaration and testing raised genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment “as to whether a ‘false park’ defect in the Coats’ Grand Caravan” caused decedents’ deaths. The court reasoned that the alleged existence of a “false park” defect in the Grand Caravan documented by NHTSA, as presented by plaintiffs’ expert, in conjunction with the circumstances of decedents’ deaths, presented disputed issues of material fact.
Pavoni illuminates the significance of expert opinions and testing in conjunction with circumstantial evidence of an event in overcoming a motion for summary judgment. In its holding, the Ninth Circuit relied in part on well-established California law allowing a plaintiff to use circumstantial evidence, which may be established by expert testimony, to demonstrate the existence of a product defect. (Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 424, 435.)
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