In Navarrete v. Meyer, 2015 No. D067454, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed summary judgment in favor of a defendant passenger in a vehicle that collided with and injured plaintiffs, holding that a jury could conclude the passenger sufficiently interfered with the defendant driver’s operation of the vehicle.
On November 26, 2009, Hayley Meyer was the front passenger of a vehicle operated by her friend Brandon Coleman. While en route to a local drugstore, Meyer instructed Coleman to turn onto a residential street as a shortcut. Meyer had traveled the residential street many times prior, and knew it contained dips that would cause a vehicle traveling at a high speed to become airborne. She informed Coleman of the dips, that it is “fun to drive fast on them,” and that “he should do it.” Meyer continued encouraging Coleman to increase his speed. Coleman obliged. He ultimately lost control of the vehicle and collided at 71 miles per hour with plaintiff Navarrete’s parked vehicle. Plaintiff Miriam Navarrete and her husband were placing one of their children in a car seat at the moment of impact. Plaintiff’s husband was killed upon impact. Plaintiff and her minor children sued Coleman, Meyer, and the County of Riverside.
Plaintiffs alleged against Meyer causes of action for violating Vehicle Code section 21701 (willful interference with the driver of a vehicle so as to affect the driver’s control of the vehicle) and civil conspiracy. For the section 21701 violation, plaintiffs contended that Meyer interfered with Coleman or the mechanism of the vehicle by instructing Coleman to drive at an unsafe speed over a road which Meyer knew would cause his vehicle to become airborne. Regarding the alleged conspiracy, plaintiffs asserted that Meyer and Coleman formed an oral or implied “agreement [to] commit a wrongful act” by driving on the residential street at an unsafe speed, which caused injuries to plaintiffs and decedent.
In her defense, Meyer moved for summary judgment, arguing the undisputed facts demonstrated she never interfered with Coleman’s control of the vehicle for liability under section 21701. Meyer further argued there was no evidence of an agreement between her and Coleman to support a tort conspiracy. Meyer asserted that simply encouraging Coleman to increase his speed was insufficient to establish liability under either cause of action. In opposition, plaintiffs argued that [v]erbal encouragement and solicitation to commit a wrongful act can constitute a civil conspiracy.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning there was “no evidence to suggest that Meyer’s act of telling Mr. Coleman to drive faster affected Mr. Coleman’s control over the vehicle . . . .” Plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment. The court determined the evidence raised a triable issue for the jury as to whether to impose joint liability on Meyer under theories of concert of action, conspiracy, and whether she unreasonably interfered with the safe operation of a vehicle.
The court’s summary judgment reversal in Navarrete presents potential liability for a passenger who influences or encourages a driver’s intentional or negligent conduct, which results in the driver causing injury to third parties. The court cautioned, however, that the intended implications of Navarrete are to apply in the limited circumstances where the advising or encouraging party has special knowledge that the incited conduct is likely to cause injury.
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